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Abstract 
For many contemporary artists, failure has been an instrument of experimentation 
and self-expression, of investigation into existential questions and manifestation 
of utopian tensions. In this paper, I will discuss how some of the well-known 
strategies of experimental and avant-garde artistic practices with failure involve 
risky actions, challenging or impossible attempts, loss of control, and compulsive 
repetition of inconclusive acts. In those experimentations, the ideal model of an 
effective and successful action performance (in which a goal is defined through a 
clear intention, a plan and a well-controlled execution) is willfully sabotaged in its 
stages. In this regard, a distinction between failure and mistake will be highlighted: 
if failure could be traced back to the tradition of heroic or tragic defeat in front of 
adverse odds, mistake on the contrary means doing something wrong that one is 
expected to control. While failure negatively reflects our tension toward 
autonomy, the focus on mistakes is the expression of rigidity and heightened risk 
aversion in contexts where maximal efficiency and self-optimization are expected. 
This paper will argue that equating the category of failure with that of mistake is 
not faithful to the motives underlying those artistic traditions. In this respect, 
artistic experimentations in the “aesthetic of failure” can also be viewed as a 
critical response toward a general mindset defined by the anxiety of control and 
obsessive mistake avoidance that seems typical of our current times.  
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Introduction 
“Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail Again. Fail better” 
(Worstward Ho, Samuel Beckett, 1983). In recent history, this line from 
playwright Samuel Beckett became a popular catchphrase of managerial 
language and the motto of start-up entrepreneurialism, along with the 
appeal to self-optimization and resilience as a way of dealing with mis-
takes and failures. Training in the “art of failing” meant to empower the 
individual to unleash his creative potential, affirm his freedom and 
autonomy, liberate him from the anxiety of not making it, and the 
temptation of defeatism. 
According to the famous analysis of Boltansky and Chiapello (1999), 
this new corporate language is directly inspired by the rebellious attitude 
of the artistic avant-garde and its anti-establishment shock techniques. 
Just as the avant-garde artist creatively innovated through the targeted 
provocation of dominant cultural codes, in the same way the strategy of 
breaking old paradigms seems to be functionalized as today’s disruptive 
organizational strategy. 
The purpose of this paper is not to go into this debate, but to point 
out how the ethics of failure is grounded on an “aesthetics of failure” that 
has been examined in the modern art tradition. On top of this, this paper 
aims to illustrate how the transformation of Beckett’s famous saying into 
a corporatist motto loses sight of the more subtle elements of the 
question of failure and, ultimately, constitutes an essential misuse of this 
concept. For many contemporary artists, failure has been in fact an 
instrument of experimentation and self-expression through the investi-
gation of one’s own limits and the manifestation of utopian tensions, 
ultimately growing into an existential examination. This will lead to the 
clarification of the difference between failure and mistake as general 
philosophical categories, involving a reference to some contemporary 
debates around the role of individual responsibility and the need of 
control that comes with it. It will be argued that the blurring of that 
distinction in today’s dominant thinking and the reduction of failure as a 
form of mistake constitute a critical departure to the “aesthetic of failure” 
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Failure and modernity 
An aesthetics of failure in the context of artistic practices can initially be 
understood in two possible ways: 1) as a failed artistic operation, namely 
one that does not succeed, and 2) as a symbolic and conceptual 
thematisation of failure within the artistic practice (failure as content). The 
first meaning refers to the situation in which the artist is unable to meet 
certain aesthetic expectations, because s/he is ill-inspired, uncreative, or 
because s/he makes blatant errors in the execution, fails to control and 
master the expressive material, or is simply rejected by the public or critics. 
Relevant in this context are many cases of famous artistic failures that later 
turned out to be successes: basically most instances of innovation and 
challenge to the dominant sensibility that paved the way for the evolution 
of new styles and new artistic ideas. Art’s outsiders such as the 
Impressionists, who first brought their work together in the Salon des 
Refusés after being rejected by the Jury of the Pariser Salon, are one 
notable example. While critics and the public mocked the Refusés at the 
beginning (1863), in the following editions of 1874, 1875 and 1886, 
participating in that exhibition became a sign of distinction and artistic 
innovation. A similar purpose was served by the Society of Independent 
Artists, an association collecting “failed” works, namely works with no 
awards or approval by juries, but who in turn rejected Duchamp’s “Foun-
tain” as unacceptable in 1917. Avant-garde provocation becomes the 
means by which failure – understood here as rejection by the public and 
institutions – becomes a device of attention. This is also true today: think 
of Christoph Büchel’s (1966-) well-planned controversies, such as the 
deconsecrated church that hosted the Icelandic pavilion and was 
converted into a real mosque during the 56th Venice Biennale, or the 
Barca Nostra exhibition at the 58th Biennale, where Büchel showcased a 
real shipwrecked boat in which hundreds of migrants died. As for the 
mosque, it was deemed an improper use of the exhibition space and the 
installation was forced to close, yet in its failure, the work remains one of 
the most discussed and remembered episodes of that Biennale. 
The second sense of failure concerns situations in which an artist 
purposely turns failure into the object of his expression. This meaning 
would not seem particularly original given that any representation of 
human defeat would fall into this category. Historically, almost every 
narrative has been a depiction of human endeavors facing the risk of 
defeat, where a protagonist goes through challenges, faces threats, and 
suffers the consequences of bad decisions and of his own character flaws. 
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Heroic challenges and tragedy are classic manifestations of it. Also in the 
context of current artistic practices, failure is a topic of numerous 
curatorial initiatives concerned with the critical issues of the present, like 
the perceived fallibility of ideological struggles and the nature of downfall 
in contemporary art-making. There are plenty of manifestations in which 
again the Beckettian statement makes its appearance: the exhibition Try 
Again. Fail again. Fail Better within the Momentum 2006, the 4th Nordic 
festival of contemporary art; the 2007 exhibition in Basel, The Art of 
Failure; and the 2013 exhibition Fail better. Moving images in the 
Hamburger Kunsthalle. As a final example, the auction Bound to fail at the 
New York-based Christie’s Gallery was actually a commercial success, 
displaying a collection of works by contemporary famed artists on the 
topic of failure. 
In these two understandings of the concept, a third possibility is left 
out, in which the artist does not passively suffer failure, nor does he 
represent it, but one in which he deliberately exposes himself to the risk 
of not succeeding. This is the case in which the artist experiments with 
the disruption of his own doing; he enacts the inconclusiveness of an 
action and the impossibility of a task. Through such gestures, he 
thematizes failure in the most direct way: not by telling it, but by showing 
it. As a synthesis of the two meanings, this third possibility is the product 
of a self-reflective process that has its origins in Romanticism and is subse-
quently developed in modernism and in contemporary artistic practices: 
failure as a formal characteristic of the work itself, as a condition of artistic 
making (and therefore, more generally, as the fusion of art and life), and 
not only as content that the artist represents with detachment. In 
modernist literature, we can see this in the provocation of traditional 
aesthetic canons, in the refusal of narrative and formal coherence, in its 
deliberate sabotage as an aesthetic tactic: Walter Benjamin had explicitly 
indicated in Franz Kafka the maximum expression of an aesthetics of 
failure1. Moreover, Theodor W. Adorno (1970) also sees in Kafka but 
especially in Beckett major examples of how modern art deliberately 
operates as sabotage through the merciless exhibition of its own fallibility 
and imperfection, becoming “anti-art”. In the context of this discussion, 
and without wanting to identify the vast topic of negativity with the issue 
 
1 “To do justice to the figure of Kafka in its purity and its peculiar beauty, one must 
never lose sight of one thing: it is the purity and beauty of failure. There is nothing 
more memorable than the fervor with which Kafka emphasized his failure” (Letter to 
Gershom Scholem, 1938). 
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of failure, I simply mention how Adorno emphasizes the difference 
between merely thematizing absurdity and failure, as Bertolt Brecht or 
the existentialists would do (think of Jean-Paul Sartre’s “didactic plays”), 
and actually performing it in a genuine way. Beckett’s works “are raised 
to the level of the most advanced artistic means” (Adorno 1984 [1961]: 
119): negativity manifests itself on a formal level through the impossibility 
of narrating and of uttering meaningful sentences: “Kafka’s prose and 
Beckett’s plays and his genuinely colossal novel The Unnamable have an 
effect in comparison to which official works of committed art look like 
children’s games – they arouse the anxiety that existentialism only talks 
about” (Adorno 1992 [1965]: 90). The existentialist position would also 
presuppose an integral and free subject who experiences the absurd, 
while in Kafka and Beckett the dissolution concerns the very subjectivity 
of the narrative subjects and of the artist himself, leading to semantic 
dead ends; in this dissolution the work of art cannot find a fulfilled form 
according to traditional canons. The aesthetics of failure in this 
perspective is not the mere representation of failure (as in the second 
meaning), nor the simple artistic “failure” (the first meaning), but 
concerns the enactment of the very impossibility to gain a perspective on 
this failure. Failure is performed rather than talked about; and in this, 
ultimately, lies its specific aesthetic value. 
Artful failures 
Performed failures concern not only the category of the negative and the 
issue of meaninglessness or absurdity, but also the artists’ attempt to self-
reflexively elaborate the nature of the art-making process, the relation-
ship between their freedom and the criteria of acceptability, and the 
pragmatic nature of the misshapen act. Typical examples in this context 
are artist’s attempts that are designated to inevitably fail, of which there 
are numerous examples in the conceptual experimentations of the 60s 
and 70s of the last century. An example is Marcel Broodthaers’s La Pluie 
(Projet pour un texte) (1969), a short film that shows the artist in the 
process of writing a text in his garden. However, the text can never be 
completed, since the rain that constantly pours down washes the ink off 
the page. Another notable example in the context of American conceptu-
alism are John Baldessari’s experimentations, such as Wrong (1967), a 
series of photographic images, most of them poorly executed, out of 
focus or unconvincing, violating the classical rules of composition. 
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Baldessari’s intention was to show how artistic freedom should also 
question criteria of wrongness or rightness. The aesthetic of imperfection 
that belong to Baldessari’s trademark is showed also in his series of 
photographic documentations where several attempts at accomplishing 
arbitrary goals are pictured: Throwing three balls in the air to get an 
equilateral triangle (1972-1973), Throwing three balls in the air to get a 
straightl line (1973), and Throwing four balls in the air to get a square 
(1974), selecting the Best out of 36 tries. The results are often imperfect 
so that the documented attempts could be considered almost-failures.  
These may seem paradoxical examples, in which the work “succeeds” 
insofar as it tries to enact something bound to fail. In this respect, the 
case of Bas Jan Ader (1942-1976) is a remarkable example of the tensions 
and limits between real and enacted failure. In his small but notorious 
body of works, the so-called Fall series shows the artist in different risky 
situations of falling: in Fall 1, Los Angeles (1970) Ader is sitting on a chair 
on the roof of his house and then suddenly loses control, rolling in slow 
motion off the roof and into the bushes below, his shoes flying off. In Fall 
2, Amsterdam (1970) the artist is riding a bicycle on a road near a canal 
and suddenly swerves into the water. The shorts are both humorous and 
tragic, a perfect representation of loss of control, of inevitable falling and 
failing: “When I fell off the roof of my house, or into a canal, it was 
because gravity made itself master over me” (Ader 1971). The works 
succeed by means of a controlled loss of control. Namely, by trying to 
perform the fact of not being the master of his own destiny, Ader stayed 
at the edge of catastrophic failure, but never crossed it. An edge that was 
yet fatally crossed in 1975, as Bas Jan Ader tried to traverse the Atlantic 
by sailing from the East Coast of the United States to Europe with a very 
small boat, as part of a project titled In search of the miraculous. He 
disappeared at sea and only the boat was recovered one year later, 
leaving his project unfulfilled, despite many suggesting to see this tragic 
event as the apotheosis of Ader’s artistic work. 
 A different issue concerns truly failed works, which are regarded as 
failed because, for instance, they were ultimately discarded by the artist 
herself or by critics, without any later reappraisal by other observers. The 
contemplation of an entire body of failed works is what we see in projects 
such as Michael Landy’s Break down (2001), in which he systematically 
destroyed all his belongings, generating more than five tons of landfill. 
Later, with Art bin (2010), Landy transformed the South London Gallery 
into a container, asking other artists to discard their works of art. The 
enormous bin becomes, in his words, “a monument to creative failure”. 
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Along an analogous path, Jeremy Deller, an artist who has often reflected 
on the imperfect and unpredictable character of artistic achievement and 
sees failing as an intrinsic and inevitable component of every making, 
presented during his retrospective Joy of people (2012) a section entitled 
My failures. In his own words: this is “a section of works that I wish I’d 
been able to make but wasn’t able to”2. Similarly, Cesare Pietroiusti 
features in his 2015 exhibition Lavori da vergognarsi, ovvero il riscatto 
delle opere neglette (Works to be ashamed of, that is, the redemption of 
neglected) works that were never exhibited, works that were started and 
never finished or were discarded because they were considered 
unsuitable or were mere derivative copies of other artists’ pieces. Their 
display, by showing not only the polished side of the artistic process, but 
also all the imperfections and the dead ends of this endeavor, functions 
as a magnifying device of the inner workings of the processes of art-
making. 
Through these examples of experimentations, we see failure as a 
disconnection between intention and action, between desire and reality 
(see Macrì 2017: 65). This allows a critical re-discussion of the idea of the 
artist/maker as the one capable of masterfully bringing a creative 
intention into reality. As a matter of fact, creative activity in its pragmatic 
dimension is an exemplary case of performed action: a subject, in this 
case the artist, starting from an inspiration, defines a goal and formulates 
an intentional plan of action based on the knowledge and the expertise 
as how to achieve the goal. Thereafter, the artist masters the execution 
of the action and leads to its completion in the final product, the artwork, 
and to its successful delivery toward an audience which is in the condition 
to appreciate it. Since art-making is marked by the ideal of mastery and 
control in which all these stages are carried out seamlessly, exercises of 
loss of control and pragmatic manumission can occur at every step of this 
performative chain, starting from the formulation of the intention, to its 
execution, up to its final fulfillment3. The Dadaist explorations on 
automatisms, to make an example, act through a radical subversion of 
intentional control, drawing inspiration from the psychoanalytic sugges-
tions on slips and missed actions, understood as an error of conscious 
 
2 https://www.jeremydeller.org/MyFailures/MyFailures.php 
3 This schematic description of an ideal course of action principally takes completed 
artworks in consideration. This of course does not exclude the fact that uncompleted 
artworks could still be aesthetically fulfilling. From this perspective, some may say that 
Michelangelo failed in completing the Pietà Rondanini, which was left unfinished, but 
is still an aesthetically remarkable work. 
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control that ultimately reveals the underlying “truth” of the unconscious 
drives. Likewise, the stage of controlled action execution is disabled in all 
experimentations that make use of chance processes, like in action paint-
ing or in the use of random operations in music (ex. Marcel Duchamp’s 
Erratum musical of 1913 and John Cage’s work). 
The willful violations of pragmatically fulfilled action coincide with the 
numerous well-known experimentations in the artistic history of the 20th 
century as a manifestation of creative freedom. The relationship between 
failure and freedom has been a central motif since Romanticism and 
Romantic art, whose peculiarity is the fact that “the subjectivity of the 
artist stands above his material and his production, since it is no longer 
dominated by the given conditions, […] but holds in its own power, and 
subject to its own choice” (Hegel 1975: 602). Later, Nietzsche’s state-
ments that life is founded and strengthened thanks to error, and that 
error is a necessity for the very definition of humanity, will ultimately 
inspire the beginnings of the avant-garde: the impulse to free oneself 
from the constraints of “correctness” as a form of affirmation of individual 
autonomy. More specifically, the avant-garde movements of the twen-
tieth century also thoroughly explored the negation of the objectuality of 
the artwork by means of operations aimed at deforming, deconstructing, 
destroying the object. Following Adorno: “The perennial revolt of art 
against art has its fundamentum in re […]. If it is essential to artworks that 
they be things, it is no less essential that they negate their own status as 
things, and thus art turns against art” (Adorno 1984 [1970]: 28): from 
Rauschenberg’s Übermalungen in the 50s (and his Erased de Kooning 
drawing, 1953) to the more explicit “Destruction art” of the 1960s. Such 
interventions investigated the performative dimension of deconstructive 
actions, such as cutting (Lucio Fontana’s canvases), dissolving (the 
chemical experimentations by Mark Boyle and Joan Hills; Ulay’s Fototot, 
1976), blowing up (several works by artists such as Arman, Jean Tinguely, 
Kendel Geers, Michael Sailstorfer), burning (Alberto Burri, Yves Klein, 
Annea Lockwood), and shattering (Robert Smithson’s Map of Broken 
Glass, 1969). The well-known trend toward the dematerialization of art in 
the 1960s (Lippard, 1969) and, more generally, conceptual art, with its 
the tension toward the (almost) total disappearance of the object and the 
denial of its aesthetic presence, are foremost manifestation of the “revolt 
of art against art”. We could include in this list all self-damaging performa-
tive operations that involve the artist’s body (Gina Pane, Chris Burden, 
Vito Acconci), but also more recent attempts to include the public itself 
in the destructive process, like in the 2011 installation Gewicht des Sehens 
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(The weight of vision) by Antonia Low, in which the floor of the exhibition 
pavilion is covered entirely by mirrored glass and the public, walking on 
the scaffolding that rests on this fragile surface, inevitably brings about 
the gradual destruction the work. 
It should be nevertheless clear that these classic examples of decon-
structive actions are not themselves exclusively associated with error or 
failure, as they make destructive actions or dematerialization a new mode 
of creation. However, they are closely associated with the possibility of 
loss of control, and thereby with the risk of unintended outcomes. In 
certain cases, we are dealing with a subjective exploration of one’s own 
limits, a manifestation of impulses that we also see in the existentialist 
reflection about the relationship between freedom and the inadequacy 
that is intrinsic to human action. A crucial point here is the fact that 
anxiety about the risk of failure in the artistic process is not attenuated by 
an open attitude towards the idea of creative error but is actually intensi-
fied by it. If, in fact, everything is acceptable in the art-making process, 
then the lack of criteria of correctness creates a disorienting void: there 
is no longer a canon, nor a school within which to position oneself, nor a 
group’s poetic, as was still the case in the historical avant-gardes. The 
mere exercise of avant-garde boutade by means of provocation for its 
own sake is not a viable long-term solution either. The artist is left alone 
in the total and free control of his expressive means (and his “freedom” 
to bring about mistakes), but this control does not rest on more clearly 
definable criteria of success. 
This is the anxiety that notoriously transpires, for instance, in Bruce 
Nauman’s early studio works, in which the artist is engaged in acts that 
are either obsessively repetitive, or outright impossible, like his 1966 
piece Failing to levitate in the studio, which documents his levitation 
efforts (sustained, not without humor, with the help of a pair of chairs) 
that are obviously doomed to failure. The common conception of the 
artist as endowed with a demiurgic and superhuman capacity is thereby 
led to the absurd. The anxiety deriving from enacting intense effort is 
mostly evident in his videotaped performances, in which the artist 
engages in repetitive and controlled actions (Stamping in the studio, 
1968, Bouncing in the corner, 1968); those movements are, like many 
later video works by him, presented in obsessively repeated loops, 
without a beginning or an end and therefore lacking a diegetic dimension. 
The impression of both anxiety and severe self-control is “a feeling that 
Nauman indeed wanted to represent because it mirrored how he felt at 
the time, not knowing how to proceed as an artist now that traditional 
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routes such as painting and sculpture had become artistically impossible” 
(van Rossem 2017). As in Beckett’s works, to which Nauman feels a 
profound affinity, the action is reduced to indefinite meaningless 
repetitions, inconclusive gestures that lead to nothing and in which the 
subject is imprisoned without possibility of escape. Failure here includes 
also the last stage of the pragmatic chain of actions, namely the successful 
viewer’s fruition: the Slow angle walk (Beckett walk), 1965, lasts more 
than an hour and is projected in a loop. How many viewers, we might ask 
ourselves, usually watch the entire film? This is what probably happens in 
many artistic experimentations exploring the extreme cinematic slow-
down or its total stasis (Remes 2015), as in Andy Warhol’s anti-films which 
can last hours (Sleep, Empire, 1964) or in Douglas Gordon’s 24 hour 
Psycho (1993), in which Alfred Hitchcock’s movie is appropriated and 
slowed down to the point of lasting a whole day. In these operations, the 
full fruition of the work by the viewers is inevitably thwarted and made 
almost impossible. 
The total subtraction from the public gaze marks the breakdown of 
the expressive and communicative nature of art, like in Daniel Buren’s 
Closed show (1968), in which the gallery doors of the artist’s exhibition 
are sealed or in Robert Barry’s Closed gallery piece (1969), an exhibition 
to which the letter of invitation reveals that “during the exhibition, the 
gallery would be closed”. Similarly, Maurizio Cattelan’s early works 
resorted to the boutade of the non-exhibition, as in his first solo show at 
a gallery in Bologna, in which the artist eluded the obligation to exhibit his 
works by leaving only a “come-back soon” sign (Torno subito, 1989), and 
Una domenica a Rivara (1991), where Cattelan escaped the building that 
was supposed to host his exhibition by leaving 12 meters of knotted 
sheets hanging from the window. In Another fucking readymade (1996), 
Cattelan showcased wrapped works stolen from a different exhibition in 
an adjacent gallery in Amsterdam. As curator Nancy Spector reveals: “The 
theft was a ‘survival tactic’: it usually takes him six months to produce a 
new work, but since he had been given only two weeks for the show, he 
decided to take the path of least resistance. It was the quickest and 
easiest thing to do”. The jester attitude of those stunts would be actually 
the manifestation of a deep-seated anxiety of failure: “my early work […] 
was really about the impossibility of doing something. This is a threat that 
still gives shape to many of my actions and work. I guess it was really 
about insecurity, about failure. We can have a chapter here called Failure” 
(Spector 2003: 26; Spector 2011). 
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Mistake, failure and “system error” 
As we mentioned earlier, avant-garde experimentalism and freedom 
from aesthetic constraints condone “mistakes”, or even support them, 
but this does not free one from the risk of failure, which remains a 
peculiar obsession in contemporary art. To make this point clear, it is 
important in this context to distinguish the notion of failure, i.e., not 
managing to accomplish something, from that of mistake, i.e., doing 
something wrong. The two notions have many points of contact and 
semantically overlap4, but I would like to focus on the following crucial 
difference: while in both failing and mistaking the subject loses control 
over a course of action, only mistake (at least, in its true meaning) 
presupposes that the subject should in principle be in control. Plainly told, 
if I cannot play the piano, I cannot make mistakes in performing a Chopin 
piece on it, I just fail to do so. Only from a certain assumed level of 
proficiency, it is possible to attribute the possibility of making mistakes. 
While the error could be the product of a mishap, a slip, an oversight, a 
momentary lack of attention, however, it is considered a mistake because 
it is contingent or accidental, not systemic or permanent: when I make a 
mistake (something “escapes” my control) it is assumed that, in similar 
circumstances, I will be able to avoid making it again (unless the error 
does not prove to be “productive” and is therefore chosen as a preferable 
course of action). Only against the backdrop of controllability (and thus 
mastery) can errors be made, and only against a set of normative assump-
tions of how things are supposed to be done, something that was not 
done as expected can be then regarded as a mistake. 
This does not mean that, on the contrary, failure concerns just 
uncontrollable and impossible actions for the subject, but as many of the 
art examples we saw above illustrate, failure distinguishes itself by the 
idea of failing despite controlled and careful effort. This idea is crucial in 
any cultural tradition, lying at the heart of any quest-based narrative and 
tragedy, that is, any representation of human deeds and actions driven 
by a desire, an intention, and effortfully oriented toward a goal attainable 
by overcoming obstacles. The individual fails at the moment in which a 
goal she has set for herself, or that she has been assigned, ends up being 
 
4 Mistakes can cause failure (by committing many mistakes in a task, I ultimately fail 
in fulfilling it), but they are neither sufficient (I can make mistakes, but nonetheless 
succeed in a task), nor necessary (I could make no mistakes whatsoever, but still fail 
at the end). 
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unfulfilled, but she can also fail when not committing any trivial error, 
since failure can be the product of circumstances beyond her control or, 
from an existentialist perspective, because it is simply the signature of any 
human endeavor. A hero tragically fails because of bad luck, unfavorable 
odds, higher powers (malignant gods) or own deep character flaws: rarely 
do we have tragic narratives in which the protagonist simply commits a 
mistake, if not as a manifestation of character flaw. Bad outcomes done 
to mere mishaps or distraction could not be the basis of tragic stories, but 
rather of comedies. 
A mistake is in fact a situation in which one makes x instead of y – 
where y was supposed to be done – as a consequence of carelessness, 
weakness or wrong beliefs. An error presupposes the existence of a 
course of action that is regarded as correct and expected to be chosen. 
This presupposes that an error could be avoidable in principle, and that 
otherwise a person could and should have prevented it. Conversely, if an 
individual cannot act correctly – prevented to do so by unsurmountable 
events that overwhelm him (or by a character flaw he cannot overcome) 
– then one cannot properly speak of mistake. 
It has to be noted that in this attempt at conceptual clarification of the 
notion of mistake, the possibility of productive or creative error is not 
ruled out, for example, in all cases where error leads to fortuitous 
accidents, serendipity, breaking out of old patterns, and allows for inno-
vative experimentation (Bertinetto 2016). The generative idea of pro-
ceeding by “trial and error” is hereby preserved. But we want to focus on 
the most direct meaning of mistake, the one that associates it with the 
idea of something one should not have done or, once committed, would 
not do again as a consequence. 
A further aspect of the difference between failure and mistake is the 
emotional nature of these experiences. In failure we have a complex 
affective range that can embrace anger and disappointment, which are 
the feelings taking hold when something was supposed to occur but did 
not, but also grief and melancholy. Failure is in fact also intimately con-
nected with a sense of loss (to lose means both to suffer a loss, as when 
something goes missing, and to fail), and grief binds us to the past, be-
comes part of the narrative defining our history and thus our identity. 
While failure is linked to a tragic (and sometimes heroic) sense of defeat 
and grief, on the contrary the affective quality of a mistake is more 
mundane and fleeting. Failure could become sublime (also aesthetically), 
when the subject is put in front of unsurmountable odds (I can say to have 
“tried my best” and still failed), while mistake, presupposing the subject’s 
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control, is rather linked with a sense of shameful embarrassment. On one 
side, “You made a mistake” sounds less serious than “You failed”. 
However, while we consider failure a possibility that may be inherent in 
our actions (as are human activities such as games or sports, which are 
essentially defined by the possibility of failure), a mistake is on the 
contrary something that weights more on the side of self-responsibility. 
A mistake could be even more shameful than failure and the anxiety 
toward the responsibility of avoiding it could be more excruciating, as is 
the case of a football player causing his team’s defeat because of an 
oversight, like an own-goal, and not because of the supremacy of the 
opposing team. “You made a mistake” means therefore also: we expected 
you to avoid doing that error, since you are supposed to have the capacity 
and the knowledge to do so.  
According to the terminology of the behavioral sciences, a 
“systematic” error, i.e., something that the subject cannot in principle 
avoid committing, is not really a mistake, but rather a bias, over which we 
do not have control and cannot otherwise avoid by choice, being it a 
tendency inherent in the structure of my decisions and actions. In this 
sense, a bias is more similar to a state of intrinsic failing. In a nutshell: 
error is the result of contingency. The absence of contingency would 
instead be a state in which for structural reasons, environmental con-
straints or individual’s intrinsic flaws, breakdown ends up occurring as a 
persistent tendency, it is a “system error”, which is instead a condition 
more akin to failure. 
As a matter of fact, I can also speak of an error committed by an 
inanimate system, for example when I speak of a genetic “transcription 
error” (which, among other things, can be evolutionarily advantageous) 
or an error in a computer operating system: in both cases it is defined as 
such because it is contingent with respect to the structure of the system. 
This consequently presupposes a normative assumption about how the 
system should normally work. Similarly, we presuppose how a subject 
should normally behave if the accidental causes of its mistake were 
removed. Failure and mistake are not to be considered as two discon-
nected categories altogether, rather we can see a continuum between 
those two poles, depending on whether or not we attribute to a subject 
a counterfactual controllability – and therefore responsibility – of the 
contingency that generates the failure/mistake. This is an issue which is 
widely debated also in the context of legal theory (Simons 1990): an 
individual who commits an inadvertent mistake – for example, dropping 
a vase from a balcony and injuring a bystander – may be held culpably 
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reckless, but if the cause of the mistake is systemic – because the balcony 
sill has a faulty construction, causing the damage – it is no longer a 
contingent mistake caused by the subject’s act, but rather a systemic 
failure. 
The anxiety of control 
If failure could be traced back to the tradition of heroic or tragic defeat in 
front of adverse odds (failing despite effort), mistake on the contrary 
means doing something wrong that one is expected to be able – at least 
in principle – to control. However, it is the problematic tendency in 
conflating the two notions that give us some clue in understanding the 
curious transformation of the “aesthetic of failure” into the corporate 
catchphrase pointed out at the beginning: the fashionable “Fail again. Fail 
better” rhetoric. In the latter, failure is seen as a desirable and positive 
stage of growth and resilience, which is out of place with the idea of failing 
despite effort and the complex affective elaborations that loss and defeat 
carry with them. The reason lies in the fact that in this interpretation, 
failure is conflated with mistake, or failure becomes mistake, since its 
value lies in the information we can extract from it in order to correct and 
overcome it in the future. But “failing again” is not understood in Beckett 
as a suggestion for a positive improvement in order to overcome the 
error, it is rather, if any, a staying in the failure, not going beyond it; in the 
Beckettian perspective one can only keep on failing, one is caught in the 
cycle of “not succeeding”, with no way out and despite all efforts: “I’ll fail 
worse again, fail still worse again” (Worstward Ho). Consequently, the 
aesthetics of failure investigated and implemented by the above-
mentioned avant-garde experimentations is diverted into a reinterpret-
tation of failure as a stage that needs to be overcome for the sake of self-
optimization. In today’s dominant interpretation, failure is something that 
needs to be effectively taken care of, in line with a so-called “solutionist” 
worldview (Morozov 2013), which holds that for every human problem or 
crisis it is always possible to deploy an efficient (and mostly technological, 
medical, and political) solution. The past is not something we have to 
linger on, but something from which we extract information useful for 
improvement. Failure, in a word, becomes akin to mistake, something 
that needs correction.   
Failure as a condition in which to linger is frowned upon also in its 
affective aspects. Recent debates point out how excessive grief and sense 
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of loss, as well as thinking too much about what was failed and lost, is a 
fundamental human experience that has been progressively pathologized 
in contemporary psychiatry and the corporate world, as it is not 
compatible with social expectations that require an individual to rapidly 
return to a well-functioning state. Loss and failure need a quick “fix”: 
lingering on and becoming attached to past drawbacks should be over-
come without affective residuals (Brinkmann 2018). Failure as mistake 
places us rather in a state of concentration on the particular, of focusing 
on the detail, on the avoidance of errors that needs to be corrected. If 
failure-originated grief, sense of tragedy and melancholy are past-
oriented emotional states, the affective connotation of future orientation 
is anxiety, the need to increase control and avoid mistakes. Anxiety of 
control and obsessive mistake avoidance paradoxically go hand in hand 
with the modern “Fail again” culture, insofar as the individual is urged to 
embrace errors, for which she is anyway responsible, as they are useful 
for her personal growth. From this perspective, the artistic practices 
discussed here, which reflect on, describe or perform failure, constitute a 
warning against reducing the category of failure to that of mere error. 
Failure can be structural, the result of social or political circumstances, or 
it can be an existential condition that cannot be shrugged off through a 
process of self-optimization. Artistic experimentations around the 
“aesthetic of failure” keep a critical attitude toward the general mindset 
defined by the anxiety of control and obsessive mistake avoidance that 
seems typical of our current times. 
Some concluding, general remarks: in an era of postmodern liquidity, 
as Zygmunt Bauman would call it, the individual is indeed endowed with 
an unprecedented freedom that nevertheless places him in a state of 
disorientation and burdens him with full self-responsibility. In other words, 
the individual, being free, is also responsible – or guilty – of the mistakes 
he commits. This is, for example, Renata Salecl’s (2010) conclusion when 
she speaks of the “tyranny of choice”, i.e., the condition in which the 
thought of self-determination only amplifies the oppressive sense of being 
solely responsible for one’s own failures, keeping the subject from looking 
for the “system errors”, namely the wider reasons that extend beyond the 
individual and the scope of his actions. Maximum freedom (to commit 
errors) coincides with maximum responsibility (to control the errors 
autonomously) and the individual is committed to the micro-management 
of his own mistakes. The culture of “putting oneself out there”, of trying 
and failing, of making mistakes and learning is coupled with a constant 
anxiety of failure/mistake. Freedom is overturned into a hidden drive for 
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constant self-exploitation and the resulting state of “burnout” (Han 2010; 
Sennett 1998).  
 The “aesthetics of failure” of the conceptual operations of the 1960s 
– with their absurd and dead-end acts – provocatively anticipate the 
paradoxicality of actions doomed to failure, while trying to bring this 
condition to a visible representation. Such performers are reminiscent of 
the characteristic protagonists of modern-day working conditions that 
are frequent objects of social commentary: as in Ken Loach’s movie Sorry 
we missed you (2019), the protagonist is inevitably led to make mistakes 
under the pressure of unrealistic performance expectations of his work-
schedule. He is in a condition of failing despite effort, like in the self-
defeating performances of the conceptual artists previously examined, 
yet here there is the difference that failure is not acknowledged as such, 
but is deceptively reframed as personal mistake. 
Performed failure as an aesthetic strategy is therefore by no means a 
celebration of mistake as a practice of one’s own resilience or as a training 
ground for self-optimization, but tries to put the impossible into action, 
at least within the paradoxical limits of its performability. It stands as 
something that cannot be overcome and erased, a condition that must be 
acknowledged. Failing as an aesthetic category acquires a redeeming 
existential quality, with a significant human and social message, yet a 
message that, as we have seen in its contemporary misinterpretations, 
likewise remains exposed to the risk of not succeeding. 
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